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OF DOCTORS, HOSPITALS AND
LIMITATIONS - "THE PATIENT'S
DILEMMA"
By JOHN P. S. McLAREN"
Act I - The Patient Bound and the Doctor Unchained
Amidst the bewildering complex of limitation periods which govern the
actionability of tort claims across Canada, an object of particular puzzlement
is the disparity between the periods applicable to negligence actions at large
on the one hand, and those prescribed for malpractice actions against various
classes of medical professionals and medical institutions on the other.
The initiation of malpractice claims against physicians in Canada is
limited in most instances to a period of one year,1 usually by virtue of special
and distinct legislative provisions, a shorter time span than pertains in the case
of other negligence actions. Only one jurisdiction, the North West Territories,
lacks a special provision covering this type of suit.2 In Newfoundland, Mani-
toba and the Yukon the limitation period is set at two years for medical
malpractice. 3 Only in the latter two jurisdictions is the period identical to
that ordained by general limitation legislation for negligence resulting in
personal injury.4
Also protected by truncated limitation periods in one jurisdiction or
another are other groups of medical professionals, such as dentists,5 pharma-
* Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
lAlberta- The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55; British
Columbia -Medical Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 239, s. 82, S.B.C. 1966, c. 26, s. 48; New
Brunswick- Medical Act, S.N.B. 1958, c. 74, s. 30; Nova Scotia- The Statute of
Limitation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 2; Ontario-The Medical Act, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 268, s. 48; Prince Edward Island-The Prince Edward Island Medical Act S.P.E.I.
1952, c. 31, s. 31; Saskatchewan - The Medical Profession Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 303, s. 55.
2 There is no mention of special limitation period in either the Medical Professions
Ordinance R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 68 or the Limitation of Actions Ordinance R.O.N.W.T.
1956, c. 59.
3Newfoundland - The Newfoundland Medical Board (Amendment) Act, S. N'Fld.
1959, No. 11, s. 2; Manitoba - The Medical Act, R.S.M. 1970, C.M. 90, s. 43; Yukon -
Medical Profession Ordinance, R.O.Y.T. 1958, c. 73, s. 10.
41n Manitoba a general revision of limitation legislation took place in 1966, in which
by specific provision in the amending Act, the limitation sections in other statutes were
brought into line- see The Limitation of Actions Amendment Act, S.M. 1966-67,
c. 32, s. 5 Schedule A, § 6-21.
5R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55 (1 year); R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 99, s. 65 (1 year); R.S.N.S.
1967, c. 168, s. 2 (1 year); S.N. N'fld. 1968, No. 82, s. 31 (2 years); R.S.O. 1970, c. 108,
s. 28 (6 months); S.P.E.I. 1969, c. 37, s. 12(2) (6 months); R.S.S. 1965, c. 311, s. 57
(12 months).
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cists, 6 veterinarians, 7 radiological technicians, 8 optometrists, 9 chiropractors, 10
naturopaths," and various types of hospitals and their professional staffs.' 2
Strangely enough this disparity in limitation periods does not exist in
the cases of assault and battery. In every jurisdiction medical men or institu-
tions are subject to the same time periods for these torts as any other individual
or institution. 13
Where there is no equivalence between the limitation periods for medical
malpractice suits and negligence actions the degree of disparity varies depend-
ing on the extent to which general limitation legislation has undergone amend-
ment. In British Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia
and Ontario, which still cling to the English Statute of Limitations of James 114
and a six year period for "actions on the case" other than slander, the
difference between the periods is four or five years.' 5 In Prince Edward Island,
Saskatchewan and Alberta, which have adopted the Uniform Act of 1931
in its virgin form,' or modified it17 and accept a two year period for negligence
in personal injury, the variance is one year.
No other professional group enjoys the same degree of procedural
protection from suit. Indeed, as general theory seems to favour treating the
6 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 282, s. 57 (6 months); R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 229 (1 year); R.S.O. 1970,
c. 348, s. 62 (6 months); R.O.Y.T. 1958, c. 87, s. 9 (1 year).
7R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 327, s. 12 (1 year); R.S.O. 1970, c. 480, s. 17 (6 months); R.S.S.
1965, c. 327, s. 18 (6 months).
8R.S.O. 1970, c. 399, s. 13 (1 year); R.S.S. 1965, c. 325, s. 12 (1 year).
9R.O.Y.T. 1958, c. 83, s. 10 (1 year).
10R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55 (1 year); R.S.S. 1965, c. 321, s. 18 (6 months); R.O.Y.T.
1958, c. 15, s. 10 (1 year).
11R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55 (1 year); R.S.S. 1965, c. 324.
12See e.g. Public Hospitals: R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 56 (1 year); R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 178,
s. 36 (2) (1 year); S. N'fld. 1971, c. 81, s. 37 (1 year); R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249, s. 15; S.P.E.I.
1959, c. 16, s. 15, and R.S.O. 1970, c. 378, s. 33 (6 months).
Mental Hospitals: Actions are barred in Alberta (R.S.A. 1970, c. 231, s. 36), Manitoba
(R.S.M. 1970, c. M110, s. 94(57)), New Brunswick (S.N.B. 1969, c. 13, s. 66(3)), P.E.I.
(S.P.E.I. 1968, c. 37, s. 57), Saskatchewan (R.S.S. 1905, c. 345, s. 54). In B.C. the limitation
period is 1 year (S.B.C. 1964, c. 29, s. 19 (2)) and in Ontario 6 months (R.S.O. 1970,
c. 270, s. 9).
13As an example of a situation involving a doctor where the limitation period applied
was that for assault and battery, see Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
Ironically the limitation period for assault and battery in that province at the time was
shorter than that for malpractice.
1421 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3. See 4.S.B.C. 1960, c. 370, s. 3; R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 133,
ss. 4, 9; R.S. N'Fld. 1952, c. 146, s. 2; R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 2; R.S.O. 1970, c. 246,
s.45 (1).
15In the case of Newfoundland the difference is four years, as a two year period
obtains in medical malpractice cases. See supra, note 3.
16For the text of the Uniform Act, see Proceedings of the 14th Annual Meeting
of the Commissioners of Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, (1931) at 38. See also
R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 87, s. 2; R.S.S. 1965, c. 84, s. 3.
17R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 51.
responsibilities of other professionals to clients as contractual in character,18
the standard contract limitation period of six years applies in the case of
malpractice suits against them by their clients. In the case of negligence suits
by third parties, which are obviously tort actions, the period is the common
one in the jurisdiction for that form of negligence. 19
Not only are medical personnel and institutions governed by shorter
periods of limitation, but the statutes also specify the date when time starts
to run. In general limitation statutes, the only guidance offered on the com-
mencement of the limitation period is contained in vague phrases such as
'from the time the cause of action arises'.20 The special malpractice provisions,
with the exception of that of New Brunswick, prescribe that time runs from
'the termination of professional services'.21
Act II - The Plot Exposed
The existence of special limitation periods for medical professionals and
institutions naturally evokes questions of when, how and why this remarkable
legislative coup occurred.
The genesis of special limitation periods in medical malpractice cases is
the Act to Amend the Medical Act passed by the Ontario legislature in 1887.22
Section 2 of that Act prescribed that
No duly registered member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
shall be liable for any action for negligence or malpractice, by reason of professional
services requested or rendered, unless such action be commenced within one year
from the date when in the matter complained of such professional services terminated.
The spirit of this provision was subsequently reproduced in special limitation
provisions in most of the other common law jurisdictions. 23
The answer to the question of how this legislation found its way into
the statute book is less obvious, because of the lack of Hansard reports
covering the legislative debates of that era. However, a hint is found in the
earliest Ontario case to interpret the provision, Miller v. Ryerson.24 In that
case the Chancery Division of the High Court was requested by the plaintiff,
18See for character of solicitor-client relationship Howell v. Hughes (1826), 5 B&C
259; 108 E.R. 97; Groom v. Crocker, [1938] 2 All E.R. 394 (C.A.); Clark v. Kirby Smith,
[1964] 2 All E.R. 835 (Ch.D.); Frind v. Sheppard, [1940] 4 D.L.R. 455 (Ont. C.A.), rev. on
other grounds [1941] S.C.R. 531; Schwebel v. Talekes, [1967] 1 O.R. 541 (C.A.). For
the nature of the architect-client relationship see Bagot v. Stevens, Scanlan & Co., [1964]
3 All. E.R. 577 (Q.B.D.).
19 0n the problems posed in finding the appropriate limitation period for professional
negligence involving misstatement or bad advice, see McLaren, The Impact of Limitation
Periods on Actionability in Negligence (1969), 7 Alta L. Rev. 247 at 267.
20The term "accrues" is used in some of the statutes.
21For some reason the term 'professional services' is used most often in relation to
actions against dentists, see J. Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1972) at 231-33.
22S.O. 1887, c. 24.
23S.A. 1906, c. 28, s. 59; S.B.C. 1947, c. 44, s. 82; S.M. 1888, c. 36, s. 9; S.N.B.
1903, c. 118; S.N'Fld, 1959, c. 11, s. 2; S.N.S. 1899, c. 32, s. 35; R.O.N.W.T. 1889, No. 5,
s. 39; S.P.E.I. 1899, c. 24, s. 22; S.S. 1906, c. 28, s. 55; O.Y. 1912, c. 1, s. 9.
24(1892), 22 O.R. 369 (C.A.).
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who was clearly out of time on a strict construction of the provision, to give
it a liberal interpretation and thereby allow her to proceed with her suit.
The Court rejected this argument, asserting that it was bound by the specific
words of the provision in the Medical Act. In rendering his judgement
Boyd C. admitted the inequities inherent in this interpretation, but contented
himself with the observation that 'it shews what an admirable safeguard has
been thrown around the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.'25
Meredith J. added the blunt comment
It is not an Act respecting limitation of actions, but one passed for the benefit of
the medical profession; nor is the provision in question an amendment of the
provisions of any such statute, but simply a provision for the special protection of
the registered members of that profession.26
One might well surmise that the amendment to the Medical Act was
the result of pressure upon the government of the day by the College of
Physicians and Surgeons. 27
The reason for the concern of the medical profession over the application
of the general limitation period for negligence seems to have been the simple
fear of being confronted with claims by disaffected patients for six years
which prior to -the early nineteen thirties was the standard period of limitations
in all the common law jurisdictions.28 In the absence of any willingness on
the part of the legislature to conduct a general revamping of limitation periods,
the conclusion seems to have been reached that a special plea for protective
legislation for medical men should be made. This viewpoint was undoubtedly
dramatized by the profession drawing attention to the tenuous position of
the physician who had to labour under the lingering threat of suit by dis-
gruntled patients. In an era when medical talents were possessed by few, when
medical services were at a premium and when medical men were often highly
respected leaders in the community, the plea had an obviously compelling
quality to it.
The form of the protective legislation is uniquely Canadian.29 There
was no precedent for special limitation periods for medical malpractice in
England. While special provisions were developed in the United States in
25Id., at 372.
261d., at 373.
271f there was more in the way of supporting documentary evidence, the writer
would have been tempted to suggest that the Legislation stemmed from an effective
lobbying campaign by the College. We do know that of the fourteen members of the
Select Committee of the Legislature to which the Bill was referred after second reading,
no less than five were doctors (Letter received from the Archives of Ontario, Jan. 15,
1973). This suggests that the medical profession had a significant presence within the
Legislature. The lobbying theory gains some support too from the debates of the Legis-
lature of New Brunswick when similar legislation was under consideration there in 1903.
The Hon. Mr. Pugsley, the minister introducing the legislation, made it abundantly clear
that not only the inspiration, but also the form of the limitation provision derived directly
from the New Brunswick Medical Society (Synoptic Reports of the Proceedings of the
Legislature of New Brunswick, 1903 Session, 117).
28Not until the publication of the Uniform Act in 1931 was there any significant
departure from the English pattern set down in the Statute of Limitations 1623.
29A point made by Boyd C. in Miller v. Ryerson, supra, note 24 at 372.
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certain jurisdictions, some predating the Ontario enactment,30 these were
incorporated into general limitation statutes with the normal vague directions
on the commencement of the limitation period. Only recently has any juris-
diction in the United States enacted a provision to the effect that time is to
run from the termination of services. 31 While there is no evidence as to why
the termination of professional services in the matter complained of was
chosen in Canada as the point from which time should run, it is probably
safe to assume that that particular formulation seemed the most likely to
provide a certain date which would be readily ascertainable by both parties. 32
Given the controversy which until recently has surrounded the determination
of the point at which time normally starts to run in negligence actions, the
concern to inject greater predictability into the operation of time periods in
malpractice suits is understandable.
Act III -A Swab Concealed
Although the legislation governing limitation periods in malpractice suits
contains a more definitive characterization of the point at which time starts
to run, its application in practice has from time to time presented serious
obstacles to patients. The satisfactory application of the limitation formula
assumes that the plaintiff-patient is aware of existence of the cause of action
within the prescribed period after the termination of services. As it is crucial
to the success of a negligence claim that there is damage or injury flowing
from negligent conduct,33 he must be in a position to realize that he has
suffered or is suffering injury from an act or omission of the physician, which
he, the patient, claims was negligent. In some instances, however, the element
which consummates the cause of action, that is the injury, may not have
revealed its symptoms, and therefore the patient is likely to be ignorant of
its existence, or even if it has, he may not be in a position to connect those
symptoms with any conduct on the part of the doctor.
The classic situation is where the doctor in carrying out an operative
procedure on the patient leaves a foreign object, for example a surgical swab,
tubing or forceps, within the body which does not manifest its presence until
much later.34 A second illustration is provided by the case where the physician
in conducting an operation or course of treatment does the job carelessly or
incompetently, and the adverse consequences are slow in developing.35 A third
situation exists where a physician negligently examines a patient, fails to
diagnose properly a medical problem and leaves the latter with the erroneous
3 0See, for example, that of New Hampshire which dates from 1867- R.S. §508:4.
3lThe State of Michigan amended its legislation to that effect in 1963. See Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.5838 (1963).
32This was accepted as the rationale in the Saskatchewan case of Tremeer v. Black
(1924), 18 Sask. L. R. 260, [1924] 2 D.L.R. 520 (C.A.), [1924] 2 W.W.R. 97. See thejudgement of Haultain C. J. at 100.
33This is conclusively settled in Canada by Long v. Western Propeller Co. Ltd. (1968),
67 D.L.R. (2d) 34 (Man. C.A.) See also Schwebel v. Telekes, [1967] 1 O.R. 541 (C.A.),
per Laskin J.A. at 544.
34See the alleged facts in Tremeer v. Black, supra, note 32.
35See the alleged facts in Miller v. Ryerson, supra, note 24.
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impression that he is medically sound, thus postponing necessary medical
treatment.36 In each of these cases the patient can justifiably argue that during
the limitation period he had no real basis for a suit, and that to allow the
statutory period of time to run in the normal way is patently inequitable.
Indeed, the victim of medical malpractice has a particularly compelling case
for special consideration because in most instances the only source of advice
and counsel regarding his physical condition will be the doctor who has
treated, operated upon, or examined him. Accordingly, his knowledge will be
limited to that of his physician. Only if the patient happens to consult another
medical practitioner may his true medical status be established, and even
then it may be too late for the purpose of bringing suit.
In the main, plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits have found themselves
in a weak position in belated discovery situations. Whether the physicians
who were the inspiration of the original legislation realized it or not, the
decision to embody the provision in a statute separate and distinct from the
Limitation Act was a protective masterstroke. Its practical effect has been
both to rule out any flexibility in interpretation, and to preclude the application
of well established legislative and equitable exceptions to the normal running
of time, which could be used in certain instances to achieve a similar effect.
Consequently in most cases the plaintiff's action has floundered on the
limitation quicksands.37
That the courts would be hamstrung by the particularity of the legislation
became evident as early as 1892 in Miller v. Ryerson.38 In that case the
plaintiff at the time of the trial was nine years old. She had been treated by
the defendant physician at the age of six. It was alleged on her behalf that
due to the negligence of the defendant she had become permanently deaf and
dumb. The action had not been launched earlier because these injuries did
not manifest themselves until three years after the conclusion of the treatment.
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that justice demanded that in such circum-
stances time could only run from the date on which the adverse consequences
became apparent, and that the limitation section in the Medical Act was
subject to the rule contained in the Limitation Act that infancy tolled the
operation of the limitation period. The Chancery Division concluded some-
what wistfully that the wording of the statute would admit of no other inter-
pretation than that the termination of professional services was the crucial
point in time, and that it was contrary to accepted cannons of interpretation
to use a general provision in one statute to limit a narrow and specific
provision in another.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion in its
interpretation of the equivalent provision in the Medical Professions Act of
36 See the Illinois case of Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 32,
262 N.E. 2d 450. The defendants in 1963 diagnosed a lump on the plaintiff's left arm as
non-malignant. Three years later it was found that it had been malignant, that the malig-
nancy had spread, and that radical surgery was required to remove the left breast, arm and
shoulder.
37The volume of cases has been small in Canada. In the four medical malpractice
cases in which belated discovery has been a problem, the plaintiff has been barred from
proceeding further in three.
38Supra, note 24.
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that province in the case of Tremeer v. Black.39 The plaintiff alleged that in
the course of a gall bladder operation performed on him in 1916 the defendant
had negligently left a tube inside him. The presence of the tube was not
revealed until a further operation in 1923 conducted by another physician.
The applicable limitation period at that time was a mere six months.40 The
plaintiff endeavoured to argue that the application of the provision was
subject to the equitable doctrine of 'fraudulent concealment which would
have made the time of discovery, that is the date of the second operation,
the relevant starting point. The Court, however, following the reasoning of
the Miller case and not without regret, concluded that the special starting
point in the statute was absolute, unlike that in the general limitation enact-
ment, and was therefore outside the purview of the equitable principle which
the plaintiff had attempted to invoke. Accordingly his action was adjudged
to be out of time.
The reasoning in the Miller case has recently received the unequivocal
approbation of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Philippon v. Legate.41 A
negligence action was launched on behalf of an infant against a doctor and
hospital as joint defendants almost eight years after the termination of
treatment. The plaintiff, therefore, faced the double obstacle of a one year period
under The Medical Act,42 and a six month period under The Public
Hospitals Act.43 The issue arose of whether the plaintiff could benefit by the
application of section 47 of The Limitation Act which allows for the tolling
of time during the infancy of the plaintiff. Schroeder I. A. speaking for the
court found that not only previous authority, but also section 45 (2) of The
Limitation Act itself precludes the application of this exception. The latter
section specifically rules out the application of the limitation periods laid out
in 45 (1) in cases where time is specially limited elsewhere. As the right to
plead the infancy exception in section 47 is tied to situations covered by
section 45, the plaintiff is clearly not a person within the contemplation of
the general statute. He closed by observing that 'in enacting s. 45 (2) the
legislature was simply giving effect to the maxim generalia specialibus non
derogant'.44
The obvious conclusion from the preceding cases is that where a court
finds that medical services have clearly terminated more than a year before the
discovery of the cause of action the terms of the legislation prevent any con-
sideration of the patient's procedural plight. However, that does not mean that
the patient is always thwarted, for the courts have been prepared to adopt a
more flexible outlook in determining just when the services rendered came to
an end. In some instances, while the realization that a cause of action exists
may postdate by a considerable margin the negligent act or omission, the judge
may be able to find that the professional services concerned continued to a date
falling within the prescribed limitation period. Of particular interest in this
39 Supra, note 32.
40R.S.S. 1920, c. 135, s. 56.
41 [1970] 1 O.R. 392, 8 D.L.R. (3d) 506 (C.A.).
4 2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 234, s. 43.
4 3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 322, s. 33.
44Supra, note 41 at 508.
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context is the Alberta decision of Gloning v. Miller.45 In 1947 the defendant
physician performed a Caesarian section on the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered
and thereafter consulted the defendant from time to time in his capacity as
family doctor for her own general medical needs and those of the child. In 1952
she consulted him about a lump in her abdomen, and when the condition did
not improve he referred her to a cancer clinic. An X-Ray revealed the presence
of forceps. The defendant then operated successfully to remove the foreign
object, and the plaintiff regained her health. McLaurin C. J. of the Trial Division
of the Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding negligence. He then turned to
the question of whether the action was barred by the limitation provision in
The Medical Professions Act.46 He evinced no doubt that if the plaintiff had
not availed herself of the services of the defendant as her family doctor and the
forceps had been removed by some other physician she would have faced an
insuperable barrier to recovery. However, because she had continued to consult
with the doctor and permitted him to remove the forceps, the court was able
to conclude
The matter complained of was the forceps, and with respect to the presence of
the forceps in her abdomen Dr. Miller was continuing to provide professional
services when he sent her to the cancer clinic and thereafter undertook to correct
the error that he had made.47
The implications of this decision are clear. It is not necessary for the
patient to prove that the subsequent treatment is a necessary and normal exten-
sion of the initial procedure. Thus in this case he did not have to prove ongoing
treatment as the aftermath of the Caesarian section, for example regular post-
operative examinations. It is enough that the consequences of his negligence
in conducting the earlier procedure, be it by leaving a foreign body inside the
patient or by damaging an organ, is treated or remedied by him at a later date.
The latter treatment may of course be significantly en retard of the termination
of any normal follow-up to the earlier procedure. In terms of substantive scope
it would not be inconsistent with the decision to apply it in the case of negligent
diagnosis where the physician subsequently treats the patient for the malady
which he had neglected to discover. Furthermore it may be permissible to extend
it to a situation where the offending doctor discovers by subsequent diagnosis
the fruits of his earlier error and refers the patient to another doctor for remedial
treatment. In such a case the treatment does not end until that reference to the
other doctor takes place. The word 'services' is clearly broad enough to incor-
porate medical examination. The circumstance where the extension would not
apply is where the services provided by the doctor have no relation to either the
initial procedure or the negligence. It is not sufficient that the doctor happens to
be treating the patient for another ailment.
The Gloning decision clearly goes far in postulating a broad notion of
continuing services. Apart from that case, however, there is little in the way
of guidance in Canadian jurisprudence. In the Ontario case of Town v. Archer"8
it was established that the term 'services' assumes the continued contact of the
45 (1953), 10 W.W.R. 414 (Alta. S.C.T.D.).
46R.S.A. 1942, c. 295, s. 64.
47Supra, note 45 at 417.
48(1902) 4 O.L.R. 383 (K.B.).
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defendant with the plaintiff, qua patient, and not in any other capacity. In that
case the plaintiff, feeling that she had been negligently treated by the defendant
after falling and injuring her ankle, consulted another physician. Thereafter her
only contacts with her former doctor were two visits to his office to register her
complaints. The court held that the defendant had not rendered professional
services to her within the year prior to launching of the action.
The functional scope of continuing medical services can only be surmised.
Following the spirit of the Gloning decision it would presumably cover any
situation where the doctor is by surgery, therapy, treatment by the prescription
of drugs and medications, or examination following up on the procedure in the
course of which it is alleged malpractice took place, or responding to the adverse
consequences of the alleged negligence. 49 Whether ongoing consultations
between the parties are necessary is a moot point. Would services be considered
as continuing where the physician gives the patient an open prescription to be
filled by a pharmacist when the supply is exhausted? Given the way in which
doctors dispense their services today and the lesser importance which is attached
to personal attendance by or on the patient, it would seem perfectly in order to
include this type of situation.
While liberal interpretation of continuing services is a boon to some
patients, it is of course far from being a complete elixir. In some instances
continuing services will not be rendered. Even if medical services related to
the negligent procedure which cause injury continue they may well be terminated
before the cause of action becomes apparent. Moreover, once the patient
changes doctors, the continuing services argument will be of no avail. There
are, of course, a variety of reasons why a patient may shift to another doctor.
Either the patient or the doctor may change location. The latter may take a
specialty or discontinue his practice. The patient may simply decide to seek
medical assistance elsewhere. In each of these instances the patient may unwit-
tingly forfeit his ability to sue the author of his misfortune.
The case law shows unequivocally that the effect of the special limitation
periods for medical malpractice in belated discovery cases depends entirely
on chance. Moreover, the resulting dichotomy in judicial response may produce
a situation in which legal and medical propriety are in direct conflict. It is clear
that the patient's legal position is only secure if he continues to seek the counsel
and advice of the errant doctor. However, medically the continuation of that rela-
tionship may be entirely detrimental to the patient. If the physician has erred
once he may well err again. Secondly, he is not as likely to be as objective in
his evaluation of a developing injury, as an independant third party would be.
Indeed, in some cases he may actively try to conceal the fruits of his ineptitude,
thus denying the patient the remedial procedures necessary to deal with his
health problems. If the patient takes the course which may be medically more
beneficial and consults another doctor, he may have thoroughly compromised
his legal position.
By any contemporary standards of sound social policy the equivocal
situation of the patient in these cases is entirely unsatisfactory and calls out
for remedy.
49A suggestion that the prescription of medications or drugs is sufficient is found in
Pierce v. Strathroy Hospital (1924), 27 O.W.N. 180 (H.C.).
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Act IV -A Prescription for Patients
There is an obvious need for legislation to correct the inequities caused by
present limitation periods in medical negligence actions. The courts have already
indicated that the task is beyond their capacity, given the specificity of the
legislative provisions with which they have been dealing.50
In a minority of jurisdictions in Canada legislative steps have been taken
which improve the patient's position. These legislative changes vary in scope
and effectiveness. None of them is entirely satisfactory.
The least effective is the Nova Scotian expedient of incorporating the
special limitation periods for doctors, dentists and hospitals in the general
Statute of Limitations.5 1 It is expressly subject to the infancy exception,5 2 and
while the statute is mute on the matter of fraud, it could be argued that the
general equitable principle of fraudulent concealment which is recognized by
both English and Canadian courts qualifies the whole act.53 Whether it does or
not may depend in the final analysis on whether the court feels compelled to
rule that the wording in the medical malpractice section, which makes the
ubiquitous reference to the termination of services, admits of no qualification
in the absence of a specific reference to concealed fraud within the Limitation
Act. Apart from this uncertainty in interpretation the Nova Scotian provision
has obvious functional short-comings. In the first place it leaves a gross disparity
of five years between the time periods applicable to medical malpractice and
ordinary negligence. Secondly, it only deals tangentially with the problem of
belated discovery.
Two provinces have decided that as a matter of policy there should be a
greater degree of contact between the general limitation statute and special
limitation provisions including those in medical legislation. In Alberta, where a
major revision of limitation legislation was undertaken in 1966,54 all special
limitation periods for tort actions are now expressly incorporated into the
general statute.55 While there is still a disparity of one year between medical
malpractice and other negligence actions, it is now clear that the statutory
exceptions for fraud and disability apply to the malpractice suits.5 6 However,
once again the response of the legislature is piecemeal, and continues the
disparity in the period of limitation.
Manitoba has stopped short of directly incorporating the special statutory
provisions into the general statutes on limitations. However, by altering its
501n Miller v. Ryerson, supra, note 24, Meredith J. at 373 stated expressly that the
solution to the plaintiff's hardship lay with the Legislature.
51R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 2.
52R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 3.
53See Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne, [1899] A.C. 351 (P.C.); Oelkers v. Ellis,
[1914] 2 K.B. 39; Lynn v. Bamber, [1930] 2 K.B. 72; Naujokot v. Bratushesky, [19421
2 D.L.R. 721 (Sask. C.A.), 2 W.W.R. 97; Beamer v. A.R.T.S. Ltd., [1949] 1 K.B. 550
(C.A.); Kitchen v. R.A.F. Assoc., [1958] 2 All E.R. (C.A.); Joncas v. Pennock (1962),
32 D.L.R. (2d) 756 (Alta. C.A.); Clark v. Woor, [1965] 2 All E.R. 353.
54An Act to Amend the Law respecting Limitation of Actions in Torts, S.A. 1966,
c. 49.
sSSee Te Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55.
56 The Litnitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, ss. 57, 59.
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Limitations
Limitation Act in 1966 the legislature set a common period for negligence
actions resulting in personal injuries of two years, and specifically brought the
shorter periods contained in special statutes such as the Medical Act into line by
express amendment.57 More significantly the province incorporated into its
general statute a series of sections based upon the English Limitation Act of
196358 which attempt to deal in general terms with the problem of belated dis-
covery. According to section 15 of the revised Limitation Act
(1) No enactment limiting the time for beginning actions affords a defence to an
action to which this section applies insofar as the action relates to, or is founded
on a cause of action in respect of which
(a) it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the material facts relating
to that cause of action were, or included, facts of a decisive character which
were at all times outside the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
plaintiff until a date which
(i) either was after the end of the limitation period fixed in respect of that
cause of action, or was not earlier than twelve months before the end
of that period, and
(ii) in either case, was a date not earlier than twelve months before the date
on which the action was begun; and
(b) the court has whether before or after the beginning of the action granted
leave for the purpose of this section.
The application of the exception is confined to cases of personal injury resulting
from negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether derived from contract,
statute or independently of either).59 Material facts are defined as decisive 'if
they were facts which a reasonable person, knowing these facts and having
obtained appropriate advice with respect to them would have regarded at that
time as determining in relation to that cause of action, that... an action would
have a reasonable prospect of succeeding and of resulting in an award of
damages sufficient to justify the bringing of the action.' 60 The exception covers
not only the situation where the plaintiff does not become aware of his injury
during the limitation period, but also instances where he knows he has suffered
injury but does not know of its nature or extent, or is unable to ascertain its
true cause.61 'Appropriate advice' is defined as 'the advice of competent persons
qualified in their respective spheres, to advise on the professional or technical
aspects of that fact or those circumstances, as the case may be.'62
These provisions clearly strike at the heart of the belated discovery prob-
lem and could well avail patients in medical malpractice cases. 63 However, the
Manitoba legislative response is deficient in a number of respects. In the first
57 Supra, note 4.
58See The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, ss. 15-21, following
the Limitations Act, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, c. 47.
59The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 15(2).
60The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 21(6).
61The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 21(5).
62The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 21(9).
63The Legislation in Manitoba suffers from sloppy drafting. There is no explicit
reference to the special limitation provisions relating to medical malpractice in Part II
which covers belated discovery. However, it is probably safe to assume that the words
'no enactment' contained in s. 15(1) refer to all other limitation provisions wherever
located.
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place it would have been more logical to have scrapped all special limitation
periods, and allowed the general statute to cover all negligence actions.6
Secondly, the provisions on belated discovery are unnecessarily complicated.
Following closely the format of the English model it takes five rather involved
sections to respond to the problem. 65 In part the length is explained by the need
to relate the provisions to other statutes such as the Trustee and Fatal Accidents
Acts, in part by lengthy interpretive passages, and in part by a rather elaborate
procedure for bringing the issue before the court. The detailed language suggests
that the legislature wanted to allow as little free rein to the courts as possible.
While accepting that injustices had taken place under the pre-existing legislative
scheme, it wanted to make abundantly clear that these provisions constituted
a closely confined exception to the norm. In fact the English experience since
1963 shows that this formulation has proven fertile soil for difficult problems of
statutory interpretation. 66 Ironically, it has been those sections dealing with
interpretation, which presumably were designed to obviate debate, that have
given the most trouble. Thus there has been a spate of litigation dealing with
the issue of whether the limitation period runs from the time the material facts
which are decisive to the recognition of a cause of action are known to the
plaintiff, or from the earliest time he can reasonably establish by seeking legal
advice that he has a right to sue.67
The only province which has dealt explicitly with the problem of late
discovery in medical malpractice cases is New Brunswick. In enacting a new
Medical Professions Act in 1958,68 the Legislature retained the short limitation
period of one year, but related the commencement of the limitation period
to the day of discovery of the cause of action.69 This provision represents
a marked improvement over the special statutes elsewhere, in that it recognizes
the basic problem and tries to meet it head on. However, even this formulation is
open to objection. It is not related to an overall attempt to merge general and
special limitation provisions. Consequently there is still a considerable disparity
between the limitation periods in malpractice and negligence in general. More-
over its wording may be criticized in that it is too abstract. More particularly
the term 'day of discovery' is used without any direction as to whether that
means the actual day of discovery, or whether it extends to the day when
discovery should reasonably have been made.
Any useful legislative approach to medical malpractice limitation periods
has to be viewed from the perspective of broad reform of limitation statutes and
their application to tort actions, particularly those covering personal injury.
641t is odd that this was not done, because most of the limitation periods for personal
injury were changed to two years by the amending legislation.
65This provides an interesting contrast with the provision on concealed fraud which
takes up three lines, supra, note 58, s. 7.
66 In Pickles v. National Coal Board, [1968] 2 All E.R. 598 (C.A.) Lord Denning
M.R. referred to the 1963 Limitation Act as 'this very complicated and obscure Act'.
67See Pickles v. N.C.B., supra, note 66; Skingsley v. Cape Asbestos Co., [1968] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 201 (C.A.); Newton v. Cammel Laird, Co., [1969] 1 W.L.R. 415 (C.A.);
Drinkwater v. Joseph Lucas Ltd., [1970] 3 All E.R. 769 (C.A.); Smith v. Central Asbestos
Co., [1972] 3 W.L.R. 333 (H.L.).
68Medical Act S.N.B. 1958, c. 74.
69 Medical Act S.N.B. 1958, c. 74, s. 30.
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The recent attempts at rationalization in Alberta and Manitoba,70 have con-
tributed to this reform, but fall short of remedying a number of deficiencies
perceived in this article. What is required is the sweeping reformative approach
contained in the 1969 Report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission on
Limitation of Actions. 71
The first principle which must be accepted is that there should be no
disparity between the limitation periods for different torts or different species
of the same tort which result in personal injury. There has never been, nor is
there now any functional reason why the length of limitation periods in negli-
gence, malpractice and trespass to the person should be different. The reason
for the differences is simply due to the anachronistic form and length of the
period set out in the Statute of Limitations of 1623.72 This concern has manifest
itself in some jurisdictions in mere ad hoc amendment to the general statute
decreasing the limitation period for trespass to the person.73 Other jurisdictions
have gone further and scrapped the six year formula and its quaint wording,
opting instead for a two year period.74 Since all jurisdictions adopted and
retained the six year limitation period until the early nineteen thirties, most of
them were subject to pressure for a reduction in the period from special interests
such as the medical profession and hospitals, and responded with special and
distinct legislative provisions.75 The confused consequences of this piecemeal
amending practice could be eliminated if a new uniform period of limitations,
more in tune with the realities of modern life, were adopted. Limitation enact-
ments have been characterized as 'acts of peace', designed to preserve defendants
from the pursuit of stale claims, to induce plaintiffs not to sleep on their rights
and to guarantee to the defendant that after a certain period the incident is closed
as a matter of law.76 Whatever the factors militating in favour of a leisurely
approach to the commencement of actions in the days of the first Stuart, the
faster pace of modern life, the greater speed and efficiency of communications
and the greater availability of expert evidence suggest that a substantially
shorter period would be satisfactory. The Ontario Law Reform Commission
has suggested a period of two years.77 The shorter period has, of course, already
been accepted by those jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Act of
1931.78 The Commission was obviously influenced in its suggestion by the
70 See text supra at pp. 94, 95.
71 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions (1969).
72 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3.
73 See British Columbia, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 370, s. 3; Newfoundland, R.S. Nfl'd. 1952,
c. 146, s. 2; Ontario R.S.O. 1970, c. 246, s. 45 (1)(J). In each of these jurisdictions the
period for assault, battery, wounding and imprisonment is four years. See also New
Brunswick R.S. N.B. 1952, c. 133, s. 4 (2 years) and Nova Scotia R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168,
s. 2 (1) (a) (1 year).
74Alberta, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 51; Manitoba, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 3(1) (d),
Prince Edward Island, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 87, s. 2; Saskatchewan, R.S.S. 1965, c. 84,
s. 3; North West Territories, R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 59, s. 3; Yukon, R.O.Y.T. 1958,
c. 66, s. 45.
75See supra, notes 1, 3-12.
76See Report of the Committee on Limitation of Actions in Personal Injury, (1962;
Cund. 1829) at 9.
77Supra, note 71 at 42.
78Supra, note 74.
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fact that all the special limitation periods in Ontario prescribe a year or less. 79
Two years, in their opinion is a period which would give adequate time to
plaintiffs to pursue their claims, and yet protect defendants from the kinds of
vexatious and annoying claims that justified special periods of limitation initially.
Given the successful experience with the two year period in six Canadian juris-
dictions it is hard to find fault with the contention that it is fair to plaintiffs.8 0
As far as defendants who have hitherto enjoyed a shorter limitation period are
concerned, the modest increase seems a minimal sacrifice in view of the con-
sistency and, thus, simplicity which will be achieved by its adoption.
The second desirable change is the articulation of a common starting point
for the commencement of the limitation period in all factual situations covered
by the same tort. In all negligence actions the point of time selected should be
the occurrence of damage. It is accepted that medical malpractice falls under
the general rubric of negligence.8 ' Whatever doubts there may have been about
the proper time for commencement of limitation periods in negligence cases
when the special legislative provisions governing medical situations were
devised, it is now settled that it is the damage or injury which completes the
cause of action.82 Accordingly there is now no reason why a different rule
should apply in medical negligence cases. If this step is taken it will mean
that the phrase 'the termination of services in the matter complained of' will
disappear from the statute book.
With the establishment of a common time period and the abandonment of
a special starting point for limitation periods in medical malpractice cases, the
rationale for separate legislative provisions disappears. Consequently, malprac-
tice cases can be subsumed under the provision dealing with torts causing
personal injury in the general limitation statute.
The coalescence of various forms of negligence in one limitation statute
opens the way for the introduction of a fourth expedient, a provision dealing
with the belated discovery. The Manitoba legislation and its English forebear
are unnecessarily complex, and, as already stated, the English formula has been
productive of a good deal of interpretative wrangling.83 This experience in
England suggests that there may be some virtue in simplicity of formulation.
No attempt will be made here to articulate in detail draft provisions covering
belated discovery. Clearly the form and scope of these will depend in the final
analysis upon how broadly the problem is viewed by the legislature, and how
far the legislature feels it can go in departing from the existing law. The point
of the comments in this article is to highlight some of the problems which are
particularly relevant to belated discovery in medical malpractice cases, and the
79Supra, note 71 at 39.
8OWhile it is difficult to find evidence to support this contention, it is perhaps
significant that a recent report of the Commission on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada
on Limitations of Actions, written by the Alberta Commissioners, has enthusiastically
espoused the two year period. Alberta, of course, has had such a limitation period for
negligence causing personal injury since the early nineteen thirties. See Proceedings of the
50th Meeting of the Conference of Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1968) 69.
8 See Nathan, Medical Negligence (London: Butterworths, 1957) at 6-19.
82See Long v. Western Propeller Co. (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 345 (Man. C.A.).
83 See text supra, at p. 95 and accompanying footnotes.
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factors which should be considered in seeking to respond effectively to those
problems in the revamping of limitation legislation.
A primary consideration is the extent to which the plaintiff should be
protected in belated discovery cases. From what has been said earlier in this
article it is clear that there are two major problems which confront the plaintiff.
The first is that he may have no idea that he has suffered any harm. The second
is that, even though he may be aware of an ailment he may be unable to associate
it with any conduct on the part of the defendant. Moreover, there is nothing
inherent in medical procedures which would alert the plaintiff to the possibility
that in subjecting himself to them he is going to suffer further harm through
carelessness on the part of the doctor. His situation is not akin to that of the
individual who has been involved in a traumatic incident, such as a road acci-
dent, which portends injury even though the injury is not readily apparent. In
most instances after undergoing surgery or treatment, a plaintiff will reasonably
assume that the medical techniques employed have been faultless, and that there
have been no complications in the absence of any information to that effect
from the doctor. Given this clear disadvantage of the plaintiff in the medical
malpractice suit in eliciting the facts which would support a cause of actions
the scope of the remedial legislation is clear. The belated discovery exception
must extend to the plaintiff's justifiable ignorance of both the fact of injury and
of the fact of a causal relationship between illness or injury and the conduct of
the doctor.
Arguably the exception should be drafted to include not only situations
where the plaintiff is oblivious of an injury or its cause, but also those where
both factors are appreciated, but the degree of injury appears trivial or its
nature obscure. Both the English and Manitoban legislation provide for these
contingencies.85 There is a major objection to this extension of the belated
discovery notion, which is that it institutes a major policy orientation in the
method of claiming damages by the backdoor. If considerable leeway is to be
allowed to plaintiffs as to when they launch claims for damages, then surely
that warrants the development of distinct legislation. It should not be handled
by mere incorporation into an existing legislative scheme, the purpose of which
has always been to expedite the launching of claims in the interest of defendants.
Legislation designed to tackle the broader problem presented by a plaintiff's
insufficient knowledge of both facts and law when faced with a decision of
whether to sue or not, obviously requires a great deal of study and debate.
Moreover, it may require responses which go far beyond the ambit of the English
and Manitoban provisions. For example, if a belated suit is allowed where trivial
damage ultimately manifests itself in more serious injury, it can be argued that
provision should be made for the situation where damages are awarded, but
subsequent deterioration in the plaintiff's health renders the award grossly
s4It is interesting to note that the English Limitation Act 1963 took as its cue the
need to protect workers who have contracted insidious diseases which take time to
manifest symptoms. In the scale of relative disadvantage plaintiffs in industrial disease
cases would seem to be better placed than their counterparts in medical malpractice cases,
because it may be argued that the working environment of the former will give them
some hint of future health problems.
8SLimitations Act 1963, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, c. 47, s. 7(3); The Limitations of Actions
Act R.S.M. 1970, c. L 150, s. 25(1).
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inadequate. However, whatever the merits or demerits of a more revolutionary
approach to the problems of inadequate knowledge on the part of plaintiffs
generally, belated discovery situations in malpractice suits would be quite
adequately covered by a provision which was confined to problems presented by
latent injury and unexplained cause.
A second issue which relates to the problem of the breadth of protection
afforded by the legislation, is how to determine the time of discovery. A simple
formula would be one which made the date of actual discovery, by the plaintiff,
of the fact of injury or cause, the starting point for the commencement of the
limitation period. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it ignores
the fact that in some situations a diligent plaintiff in a medical negligence case
might have learned of his situation earlier. The plaintiff in question may have
suffered from an ailment, or at least noticed its symptoms over a long period
of time without making any attempt to seek medical advice. The legislator
should not reward irresponsibility on the part of the plaintiff, and therefore the
legislation should be framed so that time may run from the date when the fact
of injury or its cause could reasonably have been discovered.
What factors are significant in determining whether the plaintiff should
have realized that he had the basis for an action? Heretofore the emphasis has
been placed upon the facts of injury and causation which underlie a cause of
action. This has been done advisedly because traditionally limitation periods
have commenced to run when those facts are in existence. The running of time
is not postponed merely because the plaintiff neither appreciates nor seeks advice
on his legal rights. The reason is that a procrastinating complainant could
effectively subvert the policy of limitation periods by refusing or failing to seek
the services of a lawyer. The assumption is made that the plaintiff is aware of
the facts and knows his legal rights. Consequently, he only has himself to blame
if he fails to sue within the prescribed limitation period. There is no reason why
the plaintiff in the belated discovery case who ultimately gains access to facts
should be treated differently from the plaintiff who had immediate access to
them. Accordingly, it is inequitable to use as a criterion of constructive knowl-
edge the availability of sound legal advice. Interestingly enough, the English
courts, culminating in the recent decision of the House of Lords in Smith v.
Central Asbestos Co. Ltd.,86 have concluded that the operation of the belated
discovery rules in the 1963 Limitation Act does depend upon the plaintiff receiv-
ing or having access to legal advice. This result stems from interpretation of the
distinctive terms of that Act, and consequently has no validity in Canada, except
86 [1972] 3 W.L.R. 333 (H.L.). The court by a 3 to 2 majority decided that the
plaintiff who was suffering from asbesteosis was ignorant of a 'material fact' under the
Legislation, where he had been told in good faith by the works manager of the defendant
plant, that he could not launch a negligence action while receiving disability pension,
and therefore failed to launch his action when he first knew that he had contracted the
disease. Interestingly enough three judges, two in the minority Lords Simon and Salmon,
and one of the majority Lord Pearson, decided that a person's lack of knowledge that
he has a worthwhile cause of action is not a 'material fact' which prevents time running.
Lord Pearson, however, concluded that a plaintiff did not know all of the 'material facts'
unless he knew as a fact that the defendant was at fault and that his injuries were
attributable to that fault!
The division of opinion in this case should provide an object lesson to any draftsman
wishing to follow faithfully the English pattern.
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perhaps in Manitoba. Given the basic disparity between the treatment accorded
to the 'belated' as distinguished from the 'ordinary' plaintiff produced by this
interpretation, the Canadian draftsman should be careful not to emulate the
English provision.
Surprisingly, the belated discovery provisions of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission are equivocal in this respect. The Report suggests that the English
statute is too complicated to serve as a satisfactory model.87 The Commission,
accordingly, developed a less complex series of provisions. However, these
include one section which is borrowed directly from the English statute, and
which may give rise to the interpretative problems which the Commission
presumably desired to avoid.
The draft provision reads:
The extension should be granted where a potential plaintiff was unaware of material
facts which if he were a reasonable person knowing those facts and having obtained
appropriate advice with respect to them would have been of a decisive character in
determining that he had an action
(a) which would have a reasonable prospect of succeeding and
(b) result in the award of damages sufficient to justify bringing it.88
The term 'appropriate advice' is tailormade for controversy. Does it refer to
expert advice which would apprise the plaintiff of the fact of injury, or which
would isolate the instrumentality or activity causing the harm, or does it extend
to advice that would notify the plaintiff of his legal rights? In answering this
difficult question a court might well find solace in English authority and include
legal advice, thus producing the inequity described above.
If it is accepted that no special treatment should be accorded the 'belated'
plaintiff in seeking legal advice before the commencement of the limitation
period, it is legitimate to make allowance for access to medical advice. In the
medical malpractice suit, for example where the surgeon leaves a foreign
object in the patient's body, the latter generally will not be in a position to
appreciate the significance of the injury nor to elicit its cause by exercising his
own judgement. His only source of enlightenment is likely to be a medical prac-
titioner. Accordingly the determination of the date of constructive discovery
should be related to the patient's access to sound medical advice, and whether he
reasonably availed himself of it when symptoms of his malaise developed. The
words 'medical advice' are qualified by the adjective 'sound' advisedly because
there may be situations where medical advice is sought but proves inadequate
and fails to reveal the source of the problem. In such cases it would be unfair to
the plaintiff to use the oversight of the second doctor as an excuse for denying his
suit against the first.
Having established the juncture at which the limitation period commences
to run, the final step is to determine the duration of the extension period. The
English and Manitoban Acts, as well as the Ontario Report stipulate a period
of one year.89 As discovery of the facts underlying a cause of action may take
place many years after the negligent act, a one year period seems to provide a
reasonable time for the plaintiff to act, without extending unduly the period
during which the defendant is open to suit. In two American jurisdictions in
87Supra, note 71 at 107.
881d. at 108.
89Supra, note 85, s. 7; 15 (1).
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which specific legislative reference is made to discovery in medical negligence
cases a maximum number of years is prescribed .during which the plaintiff
can plead belated discovery. 90 This is clearly designed to obviate the bringing
of claims years after the negligent act, when documentary evidence may have
disappeared, witnesses may be dead or dispersed and memories confused. It
may be questioned whether this is a desirable qualification. It has been shown
in a number of American cases that injuries caused by foreign objects left in a
patient's body, for example, may not manifest themselves for an extended period
of time.91 Moreover, the very nature of the risk which the defendant doctor
creates is that the injury which he has done will not be disclosed for some time.92
Indeed, it may be argued that the doctor has committed the double wrong of
treating the patient negligently, and of preventing the plaintiff from taking
timely action by doing it in such a way that the consequences are concealed.93
Whatever theory one uses to characterize the doctor's conduct any maximum
limitation can only serve unjustly to relieve a negligent defendant at the expense
of a deserving plaintiff. It may be more difficult for the doctor to respond with
a plausible explanation of what happened where many years have passed, but
on balance that is less troubling than the fact that injured patients will be denied
justice.
If the suggestions contained in this article pertaining to the reform of
limitation legislation were implemented there is little doubt that the palpable
injustice which is done to plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases would be effec-
tively removed. There are no cogent arguments which can be raised against the
reforms advocated and they are certainly not revolutionary. Already Manitoba
has shown the lead in bringing the time periods in all personal injury cases into
line with each other.93 The Legislature in Alberta has seen the virtue of bringing
all limitation periods together in one statute.94 New Brunswick in its Medical
Act has indicated that there is no magic in selecting the termination of services
as the point in time at which the limitation period commences to run.95 Legis-
lative reforms allowing a belated discovery exception have been uidertaken in
common law jurisdictions both within and without Canada, based on the premise
that the traditional limitation provisions have caused injustice in such cases. 96
Furthermore, the Ontario Law Reform Commission has produced a compre-
hensive and well-reasoned blueprint for reform.97 The challenge posed to the
Canadian legislators is clear.
90Connecticut G.S.A. 1958 § 52-584; Illinois Rev. Stat. 1965, c. 83, § 22.1.
91See e.g. Weinstein v. Blanchard (1932), 109 NJ.L. 332, 162 A. 601 (drainage tube
left in chest area, found 19 years later); Billings v. Sister of Mercy of Idaho (1964),
86 Id. 485, 389 P. 2d. 224 (gauze sponge left in body exposed 23 years later); Hawks v.
De Hart (1966), 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E. 2d. 187 (surgical needle left in neck discovered
17 years later).
921 am grateful to my colleague Professor Ray Brown for this observation.
93This alternative theory comes close to rationale of Rand J. in Cook v. Lewis,
[1951] S.C.R. 830 for shifting the burden of proof on the causal issue to the defendant
hunters. In his Lordship's mind the defendants committed the dual error of shooting,
carelessly, knowing that there was another party in the vicinity, and of doing it in such
a way as to confuse the issue of who actually hit him.
04 See supra text, at p. 94.
95 See supra text, at p. 96.
96 See supra text, at p. 99.
97See supra, note 71.
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